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BACKDROP FOR THE 1948 ELECTION 
The Presidential election of 1948 was one of the 
most remarkable elections of recent times. Incumbent Harry 
S. Truman had the difficult task of filling the shoes of 
the late Franklin D. Roosevelt, perhaps the most popular 
leader this nation ever had. Blocking his path to re-
election was moderate Republican Thomas E. Dewey, an exper-
ienced politician and veteran of the previous Presidential 
election. Nation Magazine reported that this G.O.P~ hopeful 
"alternately sought to picture himself as a liberal and as 
a conservative, 111 successfully drawing followers from a 
wide range of ideologies and backgrounds. Benefitting 
Dewey was a considerable amount of support from many 
sectors of the electorate, ranging from businessmen to 
blue collar workers. 
Also in contention were extreme left- and right-
wing opponents of the President, Henry A. Wallace and 
J. Strom Thurmond, respectively. Wallace entered the race 
as a martyr candidate: he was a widely renowned Secretary 
of Commerce ·until being unceremoniously dumped by Truman 
for his relatively soft stand against the Soviet Union. 
South Carolina Senator Thurmond was chosen to lead the 
I
1Nation Magazine, Volume 166, May 8, 1948, p. 497. 
1 
2
newly created "Dixiecrat" Party which was formed because 
of Southern Democrats' Party disagreements over their 
party's civil rights platform plank. Because of dissat-
isfaction each had with Truman, these two abandoned the 
Democrats and created factional parties. This opposition 
by Dixiecrat Thurmond and Progressive Wallace appeared to 
weaken the traditional liberal and Southern support of 
the Democratic Party. 
The presence of these three candidates exaggerated 
a dilemma traditionally faced by Democratic Presidential 
hopefuls. One Truman advisor aptly stated that 
~e Democratic Party is an unhappy alliance of 
Southern conservatives, Western progressives, and 
Big City labor • And it is equally true 
that the success or failure of the Democratic 
leadership can be precisely measured by its 
ability to lead enough members to the polls of 
the first Tuesday after the first Monday of 
November, 1948. 2 
Each of Truman's opponents in turn presented a viable 
alternative to voters of the three traditional Democratic 
elements. The problem was for the President to gather 
211Clifford Memorandum>" dated November 19, 1947. 
Found in the Clifford Papers, Box 21, folder entitled 
"Confidential Memo to the President," p. 3. 
the support from all of t.~ese factions without alienating 
any of the other groups. 
3
This problem was compounded by Truman himself, who 
had difficulty in fulfilling the expectations of the 
electorate in his first term of office. Early blunders 
of the Truman Administration led to a dramatic drop in 
Truman's support. One key mistake noted by Irwin Ross was 
Truman's poor handling of the railway strike in May, 1946. 
Months of deadlocked negotiations slowed the nation's trans-
portation system, curtailing electric power in some areas 
and causing many factory shutdowns. Truman brazenly 
demanded to have the opportunity to draft strikers into 
the army if the national safety was endangered. Republi-
can Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and his fellow conserva-
tives blocked passage of this measure in the Senate, 
a move that embarrassed the President and caused him 
significant political damage. Ross claimed that the 
handling of this incident "may well have been Truman's 
rashest and most inglorious act as President; it enraged 
his labor supporters and left many disinterested citizens 
with prpnounced doubts about his judgment." 3 
Ross reported overall that, in 1946, the Truman 
Administration seemed "dispirited and directionless." 
This was further complicated by the fact that 
3Irwin Ross, The Loneliest.'Campaign: The Truman 
Victory ·of 19 48. New York: The New American Library, Inc., 
p. 14. 
the mood of exultation and hope in U.S. had long 
since faded. People were irritated and bewildered 
by rising prices, labor strife, shortages of con-
sumer goods of all sorts. Returning veterans had 
difficulty finding a place to live; the purchase 
of a new car was often an impossible task, unless 
one was willing to pay an under-the-table bonus; 
in many places it was even difficult to come by 
razor blades and nylon stockings. The frustrations 
of daily living were easy to attribute to confusion 
and mismanagement in Washington; the Republicans 
summed up a national mood and provided a focus for 
resentment with a brilliant political slogan, 
"Had Enough?" By the time the election (of 1946} 
~ame, the Democratic debacle seemed fore-ordained. 4 
4 
A shift in mood following World War II is dramati-
cally evidenced by a change in the number of people 
supporting Truman. In April, 1945, a poll showed that 
87 percent of the electorate supported their new President; 
by the spring of 1948, however, the Gallup Poll found that 
5support for Truman had dwindled to a mere 36 percent. 
Even as late as October, political experts saw the race 
going to the Republican Dewey. A Newsweek Magazine poll 
4 b "d 16 I 1 ., p. 
5New Republic.· Magazine, Volume 118, May 17, 1948, 
p. 25. 
of fifty veteran political writers found that each and 
every person surveyed predicted a Dewey victory. 6 
5
Somehow, though, President Truman astounded every-
one by hurl.dling the obstacles placed before him by 
opponents Dewey, Wallace, and Thurmond and won a solid 
victory in the election of 1948. 
A number of developments help explain the Truman 
victory. First, the early support for Henry Wallace and 
the Progressive Party fell dramatically, thus taking a 
good deal of pressure off the President. Wallace entered 
the race with much hoopla; the Progressive Party candi-
date maintained a high degree of popularity through the 
spring of 19 48 ._ In fact, a nationwide poll conducted in 
March by the Kelso Tribune found Wallace the front 
runner among Presidential contenders: 24 percent of 
those completing the survey tabbed him as their choice 
for the Presidency. Truman was a distant fifth, follow-
ing Wallace and Republicans Dewey, Harold F. Stassen, 
7and Arthur Vandenburg. Wallace support dropped, how-
ever, when he would not separate his candidacy from the 
Cornmunis t Party: "Henry Wallace didn't bother to deny 
Harry S. Truman_' s charges that he was linked with the 
Communists. He simply drew a distinction: Not all of 
6Newsweek Magazine, Volume 31, October 11, 1948, p. 20. 
7Newsweek, Volume 31, March 29, 1948, p. 18. 
6
his followers were Communists. 118 Thus Truman was less 
concerned with wooing liberals' support due to Wallace's 
failing influence. The possibility of key industrial states 
going to Dewey because of a split of the Democratic vote 
decreased as Wallace support faded. 
Another factor contributing to the Truman victory 
was the smug approach taken by the Dewey camp prior to the 
election. Relying on the polls, Dewey did not criticize 
the President, nor did he make much effort to counteract 
the strong attacks applied by Truman. Robert Donovan 
discussed the Republican leaders' advice for Dewey for 
the 1948 campaign: 
Unanimously, it seems, they (Republican leaders) 
urged Dewey to say as little as possible and avoid 
controversy. Dewey was seen as having enough votes 
to win; the problem was not to lose any of. them 
by rash words. This advice coincided with his ·own 
. . . . o:· 1nst1ncts.J 
Confident of victory, Dewey de.voted.little·attention to 
the campaign. Instead, he looked ahead to the prospects 
of an Administration he thought he would eventually head. 
Donovan wrote: 
8rbid., p. 18. 
9Robert J. Donovan, Con·flict and Crisis: · The Presi--:-::~:-=--:-:---------,-------------dency of Harry S. Truman·,· -i-9·4-s--·19'48. New York: w. w. 
Norton and Co., 1977, p. 421. 
Furthermore, if victory were as likely as it 
seemed, it was better for Dewey to adopt a presi-
dential stance at once than to appear the 
perennial district attorney, because a high-minded 
campaign would help unify the country under a 
dm . . t' 10 Dewey a inistra ion. 
Dewey's complacency and unwillingness to get involved in 
11 the campaign was detrimental in the long run. In 
addition, once Dewey recognized the "defect of this 
placid strategy" in September, Donovan noted that it 
"proved impractical to change in October, when doubts 
began to arise. 1112 
The most important factor leading to Truman's 
victory, though, was the campaign itself. The vJhi te 
House staff constructed a campaign that was suitable to 
the personality of the President. He was successfully 
portrayed as a folksy, grass roots type of individual 
who was well liked,< ·especially by those citizens who 
saw him personally. Truman came a long way from his 
early days as a poor public speaker due to the efforts 
7
of his advisory staff, who sought out a method of speaking 
"off-the-cuff" from prepared outlines which enhanced 
Truman's speaking abilities. 
lOibid., p. 422. 
11 . t f 1 . · · Transcrip so Ora History Interview with George 
Elsey, July 10, 1969, pp. 195-200. 
12 Donovan, op. cit., p. 422. 
Badly nearsighted, Truman had much difficulty in 
reading from a script. He also suffered from having to 
read speech material that was lengthy, cumbersome, and 
laden with statistics that did not make for easy reading. 
Even the President's daughter discussed her father's 
public speaking weaknesses in her book Harry S. Truman: 
••• during the first three years in the White 
House, he was so acutely conscious of the histori-
cal importance of what a President said, he hesi-
tated to use anything but prepared texts. The 
result was continuous erosion of his public 
support. He read a speech badly, always seeming, 
as one man said, to be "rushing for the period." 13 
8
Truman's lack of effectiveness as a speaker was one problem 
which needed considerable work in order for the Presidential 
image to improve. 
Enter Clark Clifford, Truman's Special Counsel and 
all-around problem solver. Clifford joined the Truman 
staff as a naval aide shortly after the new administration 
took office in 1945. Only a year later, he emerged as a 
top member of the White House advisory staff. Young 
and articulate, Clifford was named Truman's Special Counsel 
in 1947, -acting as Truman's top political advisor. 
Clifford was aware of the President's weaknesses as a public 
13 Margaret Truman, Harry s. Truman. New York: 
William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1973, p. 24. 
9
speaker; he was also interested in refurbishing the 
Presidential image which had been marred by the President's 
\ 
inauspicious beginning in the White House and the insufficient 
amount of legislation aimed at solving nationwide problems 
in a post-war era. 
In a detailed memorandum outlining Truman's 1948 
campaign strategy, Clifford suggested that Truman take a 
"non-political" train trip across the nation in the spring, 
before the actual campaign was to get under way. Clifford 
envisioned a tour that would present Truman informally in 
as many cities as possible; this. he based on the effective 
"inspection tour" made by President Roosevelt in 19 40. 14 
Under the guise of allowing Truman to "meet the people," 
and to "allow everyone to get a glimpse of the President," 
the strategy was that the trip would be a platform from 
which to launch strong attacks on the 80th Congress, 
thus shifting the blame for a lack of significant legislation 
away from the White House. Clifford perceived the trip to 
be safe because the President would be viewed by local 
audiences as fulfilling his duties as Chief of State, rather 
than as a Presidential candidate seeking votes; thus, Truman 
would be free to discuss just about any topic he wished, 
15 including the poor showing of Congress. 
1411clifford Memorandum," p. 29. 
15Ibid., p. 29. 
10 
Because of its importance, I have chosen to study 
the June "non-political" tour. My analysis of the trip is 
twofold. First, despite the informality of the trip, it 
is evident that a good deal of preparation went into its 
formation. I plan to identify the key actors and groups 
which made significant inputs into this melodrama. In 
addition, I will study the amount of direct influence 
Truman had on his own campaign tour. Second, I will 
examine the effects this trip had on the planning of the 
remainder of the campaign. Along with its functions of 
improving the Presidential image and providing a medium 
for attacks of the Republican-controlled Congress, the 
tour seems to have provided a practice field for the 
actual campaign that fall. For this reason I will 
discuss the impacts of the techniques and strategies of 
the trip on the campaign--from Cadillac Square.on·Labor Day 
the first Tuesday in November. 
CHAPTER II 
PRELIMINARY PLANNING FOR THE TRIP 
As early as 1946, the Democrats knew they were in 
trouble: the party had lost control of both the House and 
the Senate that_year for the first time since the days of 
the depression. In addition, their President i.n office had 
not fared well in his first two years in office. Clifford's 
musings on the June pre-campaign trips surfaced sometime 
in the summer of 1947 in a document entitled "Victory in 
1948! Precinct to President1 111 This publication, printed 
in extremely large type for easier reading for the 
President, was apparently aimed at motivating Democratic 
Party loyalists to get busy for the upcoming 1948 election: 
NOW IS THE TIME 
To start driving home the 
issues of 1948; 
To start setting out the 
independent vote in 1948. 
The Republican Party did not WIN 
the election of 1946. 
111Victory in 1948! Precinct to President!" 
Publication found in the Clifford Papers, Box 19, D1iscellan-
eous Political File. The date and author are unknown, though 
thought to be written by Clark Clifford, according to Dennis 
Bilger, Archivist at the Truman Library. 
11 
The Democratic Party lost by DEFAULT: 
The People are on our side. 
because. 
We are on the People's side. 2 
This pep talk was c0mbined with more concrete 
12 
points on how to retain control of the legislature: appeal-
ing to women and young people, strengthening party organi-
zation, in(;'reasing the party's "manpower and money," and so 
forth. One idea mentioned had to do with presenting the 
President to the public as often as possible for publicity 
reasons. 
"
Author Clark Clifford pointed out that Democrats 
have not been able to capitalize fully on the 
President's impact on the people;" hence, ". • • sometime 
before the National Convention in 1948 the President should 
show himself to the Nation via the back platform of a cross-
country trip." 3 Such a trip was to be planned carefully, 
and, according to Clifford, the Publicity Director of the 
Democratic National Committee was to take an active role in 
the formulation of the proposed trip. This tour was per-
ceived as an important tool in regaining control of Congress 
from the Republicans, as well as to send Truman back to the 
White House for four more years. 
13 
This "non-political". trip was discussed in more 
detail by Clifford in a second memorandum written to the 
President as early as November of 1947. This important 
document was an early attempt by Clifford to "chart a 
course at this time which will contain the basic elements 
of our policy. 114 The "Clifford Memorandum" accurately 
predicted the trends of the upcoming election. He pro-
phesized that Thomas Dewey would be the Republican nominee 
and that Henry Wallace would run a third-party Presidential 
campaign. In addition, he stressed the importance of 
carrying the Wes.t in the upcoming election. In Clifford's 
words, "he (Truman) must, however,. get along with the 
westerners and with labor if he is to be re-elected. 115 
(his underlinings) Clifford stated that, by capturing the 
West, the President could win the nomination without the 
support of the "big" states--New York, Pennsylvania, 
Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, and Massachusetts. "If the 
Democratic Party is powerful enough to capture the West, 
it will almost certainly pick up enough of the doubtful 
Mciddlewes tern and Eastern states. " 6 Should this occur, 
Clifford prophesized a Truman victory in 1948: 
Therefore, political and program planning 
demands concentration upon the West and its problems, 
411clifford Memorandum," p. 1 
S Ibid. , p • 3 • 
6 Ibid. , p. 3. 
including reclamation, floods, and agriculture. 
It is the Number One Priority for the 1948 cam-
paign. The Republican Congress has already done 
its share to give the West to the Administration. 7 
14 
Winning the support of the West was complicated, 
however, by a key dilemma faced by the incumbent President 
in the election: Truman still had to act like the Presi-
dent until well after the July convention. 
He must be President of all the people and not 
merely the leader of a party, until the very last 
minute. Therefore, he must act as a President 
almost up to Election Day:1 Lincoln set the pattern 
by remaining "judiciously aloof" (to use his own 
phrase) in Illinois while his henchmen carried on 
the political war for him. Dewey, Taft, Stassen, 
and Wallace are free as birds to attack him 
but once he stoops to answer them on their level, 
he has done himself severe damage. Only Wilson 
broke this rule of being President of all of the 
people--in 1919 by aski~g for a Democratic Congress--
and the people punished him for it by returning a 
Republican one. 8 (his underlinings) 
7 Ibid • , p • 3 • 
B Ibid • , p • 2 9 • 
15 
Clifford stressed the importance of not appearing politically 
inclined until the campaign officially began; the President, 
therefore, must resort to "subterfuge--for he cannot sit 
silent. 119 A trip across the West prior to the actual cam-
paign would enable Truman to gain the support of Westerners 
without being seen by voters as politicking, an observation 
Clifford based on Roosevelt's success in his 1940 "inspection" 
tour. FDR was seen as the Chief of State fulfilling his obli-
gations as the Nation's leader; with this in mind, Clifford 
felt that Truman could use this "non-political" tour: "No 
matter how much the opposition and the press pointed 
out the political overtones of those trips, the people paid 
little attention because what they::saw was the Head of 
State performing his duties. 1110 The non-political camou-
flage of the June trip enabled Truman to take a bold stand 
on the important issues facing the electorate--high prices, 
housing, tax revision, and the conservation of natural resources 
in the West. 
All sources indicate that the Clifford Memorandum 
was indeed written by Clifford himself. It was, though, 
based on the views of cabinet members, top-level bureau-
crats, and Presidential staff members. The document developed 
from Clifford's conversations with administrative assistant 
Charles Murphy and other members of an informal gathering 
9rbid., p. 29. 
lOibid., p. 29. 
16 
known as the Oscar Ewing group. 11Ewing, an old Roosevelt 
supporter and former chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee, hosted an informal "supper group" at his apart-
ment, beginning sometime in 1946; his purpose was to formu-
late a strategy "that would make greater masses of voters 
feel that Mr. Truman 'was. pitching on their team.' 1112 
Members of this group discussed the topics presented to 
Truman in the Clifford Memorandum and had an impact on the 
document's content. Besides Clifford and Ewing, group 
members included Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan; 
Leon Keyserling, member of the Board of Economic Advisors; 
Under Secretary of Labor David Morse; Under Secretary of 
the Interior Jebbie Davidson; Wayne Coy, special assistant 
to the President in the White House; and J. Donald Kingsley, 
Assistant Federal Security Administrator. 13 Although it is 
difficult to determine the importance of this organization 
and its impact on the events of the trip, as the group's 
activities are documented only through the oral history 
interviews. It is true, though that Ewing and his colleagues 
did lend a hand in preparing Clifford to write the November, 
11Transcripts of Oral History Interview with David 
Bell, August 20, 1968, p. 52.; George Elsey, July 7, 1970, 
pp. 413-414. 
12Transcripts of Oral History Interview with Oscar 
Ewi~g, April 30, 1969, p. 127. 
13rbid., p. 127. 
1947, memorandum; members of this group also contributed 
to the drafting processes of the major addresses. 
17 
Ewing recalled that, when Clifford and other group 
members urged the President to take the pre-campaign trip, 
Truman was delighted with the idea--he wholeheartedly agreed 
with the notion of taking the trip, and actually looked 
forward to such an adventure. 14 Hence, both Truman and his 
advisors agreed early on that this trip would be an excellent 
political maneuver; by February of 1948 Oscar Chapman began 
arranging for stops to be made across the West. 
Chapman, Truman's Under Secretary of the Interior, 
was heavily involved in doing the advance work for the 
trip, planning where and when the President would visit. 
He came up with a reasonable excuse for the tour in late 
February, when Presidenb ,of the University of California 
Robert Sproul invited Truman to deliver a commencement 
speech on June 19. 15 This offer was enthusiastically 
accepted by the White House--attempts to plan an entire 
trip around this stopover in Berkeley began almost imme-
diately. In March, Chapman wrote the mayors of cities in 
the · Wes tern states 10 , 0 0 0 or. greater in population 
and asked them to host the Presidential party. For example, 
14rbid., May 2, 1969, p. 268. 
15 . t 78 Ross, op. ci ., p. • Based on an interview Ross 
had with Oscar Chapman. 
18 
he corresponded with the mayors of the six largest_ cities 
in Montana--Anaconda, Billings, Butte, Great Falls, Helena, 
and Missoula. On lye 1 three mayors replied--none positively. 
Mayor Johnson of Great Falls and Mayor O'Leary of Butte 
both responded that "no rats" were allowed in their towns, 
and Mayor Gregory of Missoula answered with a letter saying: 
"District agent agrees: Montana cities have practically no 
rat problem. 1116 The apathy found among these mayors was 
indicative of Truman's early dilemma: his popularity was 
such that local leaders either did not care if he visited 
their area or not, or they simply opposed his appearing 
altogether. 
Ironically, Mayor Barry O'Leary of Butte later changed 
his mind about hosting the Presidential party. Sometime in 
May he re-contacted the National Committee to indicate that 
he was interested in the Truman visit; this is verified 
by a set of notecards found in the M~Grath Papers which 
17 list an official invitation from O'Leary. At first, this 
request by the mayor of Butte was turned down~ A telegram 
from the National Committee to O'Leary said that the 
18 itinerary was "pretty well formed." Somewhere along the 
16chapman Papers, Box 84, California Presidential 
Trip File. 
17set of notecards of requests made of the Presidential 
Staff, undated, found in the McGrath Papers, Box 64, 
President's Western Trip File. 
18Telegram copy from J. Howard McGrath to Mayor 
Barry O'Leary, dated May 26, 1948, found in.the Chapman 
Papers, Box 84, California Presidential Trip File. 
line, though, the White House decided to favor O'Leary's 
request as the President did visit Butte on the eighth of 
June. 
19 
O'Leary's change of heart could have been a result 
of the increase in the nationwide interest in the June 
tour. In May, dozens of cities, schools, and other 
organizations wrote to the White House asking that toe 
President make a stop in their town. One typical request 
came from the county commission of Flathead County, Montana. 
Commissioner. c. K. Dickey sent a three page letter to D.N.C. 
Chairman, Senator J. Howard McGrath, on April 27. This 
correspondence·was quite obviously from a small town--
the commission's stationery carried a photograph of a local 
lake which dominated the top third of each page. Dickey's 
typewritten effort is also laden with changes made in black 
pen. Dickey hoped to have Truman come to the area to dedi-
pate "Hungry Horse Dam"--he even suggested that they might 
name the body of water created by the dam "Truman Lake." 
After consideration by Chairman McGrath, though, the re-
quest was denied in a letter dated May 18. 19 Dozens of 
similar invitations flowed in, especially during May. 
Requests ranged from asking Truman to give the "Speech of 
the Day" in Kirksville, Missouri, at a local air show, to 
19Letters from Dickey and McGrath found in the 
Chapman Papers, Box 84, California Presidential Trip File. 
20 
an engraved invitation from Austin High School in Chicago 
for "The President of the United States to attend a school 
assembly program on a day of his selection in June, 1948. 1120 
Not all of these groups could be accommodated, .thou'gh,; and 
McGrath declined many invitations. 
Whereas the advance work and background setting up 
of the trip was taken care of, for the most part, by the 
National Committee, the research and formulation of the 
speeches to be given on the tour was undertaken by the 
Democratic National Committee's Research Division and 
Truman's own White House staff. Research for the June 
tour began around the end of March with the formulation of 
the Research Division. This was an organization developed 
for the first time in 1948 specifically for the purpose of 
re-electing the President. A liberal lawyer from Phila-
delphia, William L. Batt, Jr., was given full responsibility 
to form an organization which was, for all intents and 
purposes, independent of the National Committee itself. 
Batt, an unsuccessful Congressional candidate in 1946 and 
active member of the Americans for Democratic Action, was 
recommended to Clifford to fill this post by Under Secretary 
20Additional requests located in the California Trip 
File of the Chapman Papers as well. 
21 
of Labor David Morse. 21 His assignment was to assemble 
background material for the tour and assist with writing the 
22 major speeches. 
A: :memorandum dated May 3rd from Batt to Clifford 
and "all those concerned" outlined the research to be 
done. A "File of the Facts" was to be developed in May 
of 1948, consisting of separate files containing infor-
mation on a variety of topics. One set of the proposed 
files was entitled "The Democratic Plan for the Future." 
Here, Batt wanted to include Democratic plans to solve 
current problems, as well as Presidential quotations ger-
mane to each issue area. Two additional topics suggested 
by Batt were "The Democratic Record" and the "Republican 
Record of Blocking." Batt's attempt was to juxtapose 
Democratic efforts to pass legislation with G.O.P. opposi-
tion of these needed bills. This was all drawn together 
by a "PLAN OF ACTION," including a draft of the Democratic 
platform plank and suggestions for Presidential statements 
. f . 23 on a variety o issues. 
21Ross ,· op. cit., p. 79. 
22Transcripts of Oral History Interview with Dr. 
Johannes Haeber, July 13, 1966, p. 12. 
23May 3 Memorandum from Batt to Clifford, found in 
the Clifford Papers, Box 20, in the folder entitled "WLBatt, 
Jr., Dir. of Research, Dem. Nat. Com.-Misc. corres." This para-
·grapb. i.~ . based on this memorandum, as I was unable to locate 
the actual Files. 
22 
In addition, the Research Division gathered back-
ground information on each city to be visited on the tour. 
Researchers identified the important local politicians and 
dignitaries, significant problems and issues of the locality, 
and recorded the local vote for each of the two previous 
Presidential elections. Combining_ information from the 
"Files of the Facts'! and background data for each city, 
the Division could create the speaking outlines, which 
were developed to provide the President with information 
he could use to warm up to the local audience. This was 
incorporated with a set of more serious information that 
was up-to-date and well-suited for the audience he was 
addressing. Batt's organization_ gathered this data in 
May, 1948, so that Truman would be carefully prepared to 
speak in each stop on the June cross-country tour. 
Indirect input into Clifford's writings from 
a wide assortment of cabinet members and White House staff 
personnel indicates th.at a number of people had the idea 
for this trip in mind as early as the fall of 1947. These 
people helped Clifford formulate his thoughts ·and develop 
a campaign strategy which stressed the importance of 
. gaining the support of voters in the West. Obviously, 
this trip was considered carefully long before the 
Presidential train was to leave Washington. Clifford 
first conceived the idea long before the 1948 campaign. 
Once Clifford and his associates· developed this 
idea, two groups, the Democratic National Committee and 
its Research Division, became extensively involved in 
preliminary preparations for the trip. As we move into 
the actual creation of the whistlestop talks, it is 
apparent that the input of the National Committee is 
insignificant; the.White House staff and various key 
bureaucrats join the Research Division in writing and 
processing what was planned for the President to say. 
23 
CHAPTER III 
THE WHISTLESTOP SPEECHES 
Throughout his first term in office, Truman's public 
speaking efforts were, for the most part, quite bad. His 
poor eyesight made it difficult for him to read from a 
script. His prepared speeches to date had been, at best, 
most forgettable, for the President was unable to be effec-
tive when reading word for word. An attempt to remedy the 
situation was made by Charles Murphy, a veteran Democrat 
from the Roosevelt Administration and one of the President's 
top aides. Members of the White House staff and the "Ewing 
group" considered for some time an idea to have Truman speak 
from some sort of outline rather than an actual speaking 
draft. 1 Murphy implemented this idea early in the spring 
of 1948. On April 17th, Truman addressed the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors where he gave his usual 
ploddi:t1g speech. Followi!}g this address, he went "off the 
record"--speaking from an outline composed of complete 
sentences--on American relations with the Soviet Union. 
Truman's remarks were interrupted numerous times with 
laughter and applause. The audience found several of his 
opening remarks humorous. For example: 
1Transcripts of Oral History Interview with William 
Batt, Jr., July 27, 1966, pp. 31-32. 
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I remember that some two years ago, I think it 
was, this organization met in the East Room of the 
White House, and I was foolish enough to invite 
them to ask me questions. Then last year, I in-
vited them to come down to the Executive Office, 
and I profited by the previous year's experience 
2and I did the talking myself. (laughter) 
25 
To Truman's pleasure, strong, serious statements were also 
well accepted: 
••• because I want you to understand that all 
the people in the United States I am the one who 
wants peace most, I am the one who wants the 
country to be in a position where it will never 
have to go to war again. (applause) 3
As Truman recalled:~ later in his memoirs, "When I finished 
my remarks about thirty minutes later I was surprised to 
get the most enthusiastic applause that I had ever received 
from a group made up of Republicans. 114 
2copy of the off-the-record remarks found in the 
Charles Murphy Files, Box 1, folder entitled "April 17, 19 48: 
American Society of Newspaper Editors." 
3·Ibid. 
4 . b Harry s. Truman, Memoirs y Harry s. Truman. Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., Volume II, p. 179. 
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For these remarks, the President was provided with 
a fairly detailed outline, composed of complete sentences. 
Truman could thus read straight from his sheet much of the 
time; he did, however, have the opportunity to deviate from 
Murphy's straightforward notes on the subject and impro-
vise whenever he saw fit. He spoke quite often without 
regard to his notes; most of the remarks that drew laughter 
5--including the one quoted above--were Truman's own. The 
presence of the outline, though, kept the President on 
course for the most part, not allowing him to ramble and 
miss key points. The success of the talk was based on the 
new type of outline created by Murphy. Truman covered the 
intended issue, but more importantly, was able to make his 
talk more personal. Truman's sense of humor and folksy 
charm came out in this format where it would not when reading 
d . t 6 a ry scrip. 
Truman's success in the spring when speaking from 
outlines led to a return to this format throughout the 
June trip. Presidential advisor George Elsey recalled 
that the staff took a two track approach to the campa~gn. 
on one hand were the "major, prepared, full-fle~ged,·policy 
speeches that would be read from a prepared text and that 
would cover the full range of·issues of the campa~gn. 117 
5An outline for the talk also exists in the Murphy 
Files, Box 1, of the same folder. 
6·1bid. 
7Transcripts of Oral History Interview with George 
Elsey, July 10, 1969, p. 195. 
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Five such addresses were given, in Chicago, Omaha, Seattle, 
Berkeley, and Los Angeles. The series of back platform 
talks complemented these major speeches. Approximately 
65 cities in sixteen states.were visited in between Truman's 
major stops--these cities hosted the Presidential 
"whistlestop" talks. 
Incidentally, the term "whistles top" was coined by 
Senate Majority leader Robert Taft in an unfavorable 
manner. On ~he Senate floor, Taft c~itically suggested that 
the President was out speaking at every "whistlestop" in 
8the country. In the same way that Roosevelt adopted the 
term "boondoggling" in his 1936 campaign, Truman turned 
this term of reproach into a compliment; he used "whisble-
stop" to describe his platform talks regularly throughout 
the campaign. 
These whistles tops were where Truman spoke off-the-·· 
cuff from the prepared outline. A handful of stops were 
made in the Midwest en route to the West and back; most of 
the talks, however, came in the Western states--Montana, 
Idaho, Washi~gton, Oregon, California, and New Mexico. 
Citizens of California, Washington, and Or~gon had the 
greatest amount of exposure to the President; one-third, or 
twenty-three, of the cities he visited were in these states 
8Transcripts of Oral History Interview with Charles 
Murphy, May 2, 1963, p. 1. 
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combined. Stopovers in each of these towns were often very 
brief, say, from fifteen to thirty minutes in length. Still, 
Truman would step out on the back platform and present him-
self to the local audience in an informal--and apparently 
unplanned--manner. Having a set of outlines prepared in 
advance allowed the busy President to be prepared to speak 
at any time, simply by opening a notebook and seeing what 
would be appropriate to say. 9
Though outwardly simple in appearance, Truman's 
informal whistlestop speeches were based on a considerable 
amount of preparation. The preliminary research for three 
general sections of the talk--opening, discussion of key 
issues, and closing peroration--was conducted individually 
by the researchers. They would then meet with Batt in 
order to refine their material, and, time permitti~g, would 
create outlines of talks that could be made by Truman in 
each particular city. Occasionally, though, the Division 
was unable to produce speaki~g outlines, in which case only 
a ro~gh set of information was passed alo~g to the 
Presidential train. 
Interesti~gly, the activities of the Research Divi-
sion were kept under wraps until after the June tour, 
according to Division member Dr. Johannes Haeber. Haeber 
g Ibid • , pp. 3- 4 • 
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remembered that the secrecy surrounding the organization 
was due to "the nature of the people who were recruited for 
the Research Division. The Research Division had a very 
strong and outspoken A.D.A., American Veterans Committee 
slant ... lo I contend, though, that this cover-up was more 
than likely based on the premise of covering up the back-
ground work done on the whistlestop speeches. As long as 
people did not realize that a behind-the-scenes group was 
preparing Truman's remarks, they could conclude ·that their 
President was speaking spontaneously from his heart. By 
hiding the actions of a research group such as Batt's 
Division, a homey, folksy image resulted where it would not 
had people suspected Truman's remarks were planned by others. 
On the Presidential train, George Elsey received 
the information passed along by the Research Division. Elsey, 
who was responsible for preparing the final outline, used 
the bac~ground information and prepared Truman's speaking 
copy. At times, local events would occur--such as a flood·· 
in the Northwest immediately prior to Truman's arrival--
which would make ·the entire preparations of the Research 
Division obsolete. In this event, Elsey would substitute 
current material to reflect more accurately the local 
situation; Elsey recalled that he occasionally had to do 
this with only a few hours' notice. 11 
lOTranscripts of Oral History Interviews with Dr. 
Johannes Haeber, July 13, 1966, p. 25. 
11Transcripts of Oral History Interviews with George 
Elsey, February 17, 1964, pp. 60-61. 
The whistlestop talks were loosely organized into 
three sections. They often opened with mention of the 
principal political activities, along with some local 
political color. For example, Truman referred to two of 
the region's power producing dams in his June 12 address 
in Roseville, California: 
I have been having a beautiful ride through this 
_, 
Western country in the last three or four days, and 
I think I have had a liberal education on a lot of 
things • and between the Shasta Dam and the 
Folsom Dam and the improvements that are to be made 
at the mouth of the Sacramento River outside of San 
Francisco, sometime or other both the North and 
the South ends of this valley will be much happier 
about the water situation than the~ are now. 12 
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Opening information came from the most recent Works Progress 
Administration guidelines which contained detailed informa-
tion on practically every community in the country. These 
documents yielded facts that were seen as important in the 
outline preparation process, such as the local political 
leaders, and_ ge~graphic and economic information, as 
exampled by the key area dams referred to in Roseville. 
12Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States:· Harry s·.· Truman. Volume from January 1 to December 
31, 1948, Washington: U.S. Government Printi~g Office, 
1964, p. 332. 
''. 
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While other people did much background work and 
research for the whistlestop talks, Truman did make some 
important contributions to their content. Batt recalled 
that Truman's own odd assortment of facts often supplemented 
the background information prepared by the Division. 13 
Batt's recollections are exemplified by Truman's remarks 
in Portland on June 11 which were most likely added by the 
President himself. Here, he related the water and flood 
control issue to his hometown of Independence, Missouri: 
I have always been interested in the development 
and the control of the great rivers of this country. 
I live on the Missouri River at Independence, Mo., 
where a great many people started when this town 
was first organized over the Oregon Trail. 
Independence, ·Mo., is by the Missouri River, 
and about one year in three the damage from that 
river basin has been all the way from $100 million 
to $500 million . . . . As I said yesterday in 
Seattle, I want to see the river developed for 
the benefit of the people, for power, for ~aviga-
tion, for reclamation, for flood control, and that 
can be done, and should be done. 14 
13Transcripts of Oral History Interviews with William 
Batt, Jr., July 26, 1966, pp. 9-10. 
14Public Papers of the President, p. 324. 
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Other Truman comments were obviously of his own doing. Such 
items, often humorous, were occasionally used to warm up to 
the audience. His opening remarks at Butte, Montana, on 
the eighth of June, include the following: 
I can't tell you how overwhelmed I am at the welcome 
you gave me this afternoon on the streets. In 
Kansas City, which is a suburb of my hometown, 
I never had such a welcome. There are only two 
other places that I know of to compare with it; 
one was at Mexico City (SIC) and at Rio de Janeiro, 
the capital of Brazii. 15 
One of Truman's favorite opening techniques was to 
discuss the amazing size of the crowd, and to contend that 
this audience was even bigger than the last huge crowd he 
16 had seen. 
As he said in Las Vegas, New Mexico, on June 15: 
I thought I had seen nearly all the people in New 
Mexico at Gallup. Then when I got to Albuquerque, 
it looked as if the people had come in from all 
the other states. The mayor of Albuquerque told 
me it was the biggest crowd that had ever been out 
in Albuquerque. And now it looks as if Las Vegas 
17 has shown them all how. 
lSibid., p. 324. 
16Transcripts of Oral History Interviews with Charles 
Murphy, May 2, 1963, p. 2. 
17Public• Papers of the President, p. 358. 
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This was typically followed by some suggestion or comments 
about local issue. In Las Vegas, the water issue was 
highlighted: 
I have had with me in the Northwest, and here 11 
in New Mexico, the Secretary of the Interior, 
who is interested in reclamation and irrigation 
and flood control in all this section of the 
country. And we have a plan and a program which 
will meet the situation in every section of 
the country if we can just get a Co~gress that 
will agree with us. That is what we are asking 
for. From the looks of things, I think we are 
going to get that sort of support. 18 
In addition to the ad hoc comments that Truman con-
tributed to the whistlestop talks, he had influence on the 
material. gathered by the Research Division. Batt recalled 
that the President specifically asked for, and received, 
information he could use as local color, a short form on 
the positions held by local members of Congress, and infor-
mation on the most important issue in each connnunity. 
Truman's delegation of authority in this instance is 
indicative of his-input on the information collected by 
Batt's. group. Truman's notion of including the key issue 
for the r~gion was stressed heavily by his staff in their 
l BIbid. , p • 3 5 8 • 
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collection of the background data. For this reason, the 
Research Division maintained contact with local political 
groups and Congress in order to have the President discuss 
~h k . 1. 19 u e ey regruona issue. 
An example supporting this premise would be contact 
the Truman staff had with D.N.C. committeeman Monroe 
Sweetland of Oregon. Early in June, Sweetland told Clifford 
that the issue of western development--including the conser-
vation of natural resources and the development of water 
projects for flood control and power--was one which the 
Democrats could use advantageously while in the Pacific 
Northwest. At that time, Oregonians were particularly 
upset with the Republican record along these lines, speci-
fically, that the G.O.P. had not come thro~gh with water 
development projects which were vital to area growth. 
According to Sweetland: 
Politically we (the Democrats) have the GOP 
over a barrel on Western development. The tax 
cutters have sliced funds from our region merci-
lessly, and have delayed by years the full develop-
ment of the Columbia, the Williamette Valley Flood 
Control. 20 
19Transcripts of Oral History Interviews with Kenneth 
Birkhead, July 7, 1966, pp. 10-12: George Elsey, February 
1 7 , 19 6 4 , p • 61 • 
20Memorandum from Monroe Sweetland, found in the 
Clifford Papers, Box 32, Washington State Press Club File. 
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In addition, he mentioned that a number of coastal ports--
Brookings, Coos Bay, Reeds Port, Newport, Tillamoak, Astoria, 
and Gary's Harbor--also felt ignored and neglected by the 
Republicans. The vulnerable Republican position, it was 
suggested, should be attac~ed accordingly. This is an ex-
ample of information sought by the Truman camp in order to 
have their candidate dealing with the region's key issue; 
while apparently an informal, homespun campaign, the Truman 
effort was indeed a result of careful planning and contact 
with local officials. 
As it turned out, one of the most damaging floods 
in years devastated the Pacific Northwest just·a few days 
prior to Truman's arrival. The Red Cross reported that 
greater than 47,000 persons were left homeless by the 
disaster; Oregon was the hardest hit, with some 26,000 left 
without homes. 21 For Truman's purpose, the flood came at 
an opportune time, enabli!lg the President to place the 
blame for the disaster on the Republicans for not pro-
viding the desired Western water developments. Speaki~g 
in Portland on June 11, the President assured listeners 
that he was ".tryi!}g to convince those people, and if I 
succeed in that, we will_ get the proper developments of 
22 those powers." He suggested that he wanted to see the 
21New York Times, June 7, 1948, Section 5, p. 21. 
22Public Papers· of the President, p. 325. 
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river "developed for the benefit of the people, for power, 
for navigation, for reclamation and for the flood control, 
and that can be done, and should be done." 23 Truman 
indirectly referred to "some people ••• who do not like 
public power," thus attributing the disaster to the 
Republicans, "people who do not like to expend money for 
the reclamation of the land in the West. 1124 The President 
successfully capitalized on this vital issue as suggested 
by Oregonian Sweetland by indicting the opposing party 
and assuring the audience that he was firmly in their 
corner. 
Researchers usually closed the whistlestop out-
lines with a peroration buildi~g up the Democratic Party. 
This is indicated by remarks Truman often gave flattering 
local Democratic Congressmen, such as in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, on June 15. Here Truman closed by making several 
kind statements about New Mexico Senators Dennis Chavez 
and Carl A. Hatch: "If we had more men like these gentle-
men in the House and in the Senate, I wouldn't be havi~g 
the trouble I am having-~going around the country and 
throwi~g bricks at the Co~gress." 2~ Truman's lauding of 
local d~gnitaries occasionally cvossed partisan boundries. 
In Emporia, Kansas, Truman saluted local journalist William 
23rbid., p. 324. 
24 rbid., pp. 324-325. 
2 5 Ibid. , p • 35 8 • 
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Allen White, a staunch Republican, by signing a resolution 
in front of the audience authorizing a three-cent stamp 
honoring the Kansas publisher. "William Allen White was 
one of the country's great men," said Truman. "He was a 
great editor, he was a humanitarian, and he always worked 
f th .. h . ' . •• 26 h 1 . t'or e rig tin my opinion. Te cosing perora ion was 
a - means to promote Truman and the Democratic Party 
informally in a way that would aid the President by linking 
him with esteemed local leaders. 
The material for the whistlestops, therefore, actu-
ally went through four stages: the initial research, 
refinement and development of the outline by Batt and the 
researcher, final outlining by Elsey, and finally, the 
changes and impromptu inclusions made by the President 
himself. Clearly, this was a well-planned process, unlike 
or perhaps in spite of the informal nature of the trip. 
The whistlestop speeches were indeed much more than 
simply sending President Truman out on the back platform 
and havi~g him say a few words. These talks were well-
planned and, if anything, _their informal nature created 
by Truman's own input helped hide the fact that preparations 
were substantial. The whistlestops were one method by 
which ·Truman-was able to improve his im~ge: by meeting 
26-Ibid., p. 358. 
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people in an intimate type of setting with freedom to say 
what he wanted--within certain guidelines--Truman was able 
to come across as a likeable, homespun type of character, 
unlike the Presidential image depicted by the media. 
I submit that the Truman staff intended to portray 
their candidate as someone who was doing all of his 
speaking on his own, while, in fact, a significant amount 
of manipulation was going on. Granted, Truman did con-
tribute to the content of his talks, both with his spon-
taneous conunents about the local situation and his requests 
of Batt to include certain types of materials in his notes. 
Still, the vast majority of the input in the actual words 
spoken by Truman came from outside sources: the Research 
Division handled the gathering of background material; 
George Elsey drafted and edited Truman's speaking outlines; 
individuals such as Monroe Sweetland provided information· 
vital in making sure Truman's statements would reflect 
the needs and concerns of the local audience. All in all, 
Truman's platform talks aided in creating a more favorable 
Presidential image. Truman's informal appearance success-
fully camoufl~ged the extensive preparational work 
contributed by a variety in individuals. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MAJOR ADDRESSES 
While it is apparent that much time and effort 
went into planning the platform addresses, Truman's 
five major addresses were the beneficiaries of a much 
greater amount of prepa~atory work. · Tr.urnan:: gav~. tiv:e. key 
speeches: in Chicago~·- . on June fourth, to the Swedish 
Pioneer Centennial Association; in Omaha, on June fifth, 
to a reunion of the .Thirty-Fifth Division; in: :Seattle 
on June 10th to the Washington State Press Club; in 
Berkeley on June 12th, to the graduating seniors at the 
University of California; and finally, in Los Angeles, 
on June 14th, to the Greater Los Angeles Press Club. Each 
address_ was ·a- _. :· ·strong, issue-oriented policy announce-
ment, resulting from a vast amount of participation and 
cooperation among White House staff members, various 
speech-writers, top-level officials, and Research 
Division members. 
Whereas George Elsey was responsible for creating 
Truman's whistlestop outlines, Clark Clifford monitored 
the drafting of the major addresses. In addition, 
Elsey wrote speeches, edited drafts, and coordinated input 
from other contributors. Still, Clifford maintained con-
trol of the situation; while open to the opinions and 
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suggestions of others it is clear that he made all final 
decisions pertaining to the long speeches. 
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Preparation for each address began two to three 
weeks prior to the actual speaking date when the main 
points of the speech were developed in an outline by 
either Clifford or the ass~gned speechwriter. The draft~ 
ing process soon followed,.where one speechwriter would 
consult a rough draft which was commented on, edited, and 
returned to him. After numerous comments and cha~ges, 
a final copy reached the President, who would then make 
last-minute additions the day of the speech before taking 
the podium. 
This section will concentrate on the inputs of 
these various individuals to the speechwriting process as 
evidenced by existing material at the Truman Library. 
The papers of key individuals of the White House staff--
Clark Clifford, Geo~ge Elsey, Charles Murphy, Philleo 
Nash, Oscar Chapman, and others--contain various drafts of 
each speech ·and memoranda between staff members. In 
addition, some files include handwritten notes indicating 
conversations amo~g the key actors and other miscellaneous 
material related to the June tour. All material dealing 
with this non-political journey was examined in my effor~ 
to delve into the Truman pre-campaign trip. 
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Chicago: June 4: 
Barely twenty-four hours out of Washington, Truman 
spoke in Chicago before the Swedish Pioneer Centennial 
Association. As with each of the key speeches, prepara-
tions for the Chicago address began early. On May 18, two-
and-one-half weeks before the actual speaking date, speech-
writer Philleo Nash sent a pre-write memorandum to Clifford 
outlining the necessary components of the speech. Nash, 
the White House expert on foreign affairs, perceived that 
the opening should be devoted to the Centennial itself, 
containing information about Swedish migration to the 
Midwest. This opening, suggested Nash, would "consist 
of a statement by the President of the facts about Swedish 
migration to the Middle West ••• and something about 
their (the Swedish) contributions to the life of our 
country. 111 The opening should be followed by a "considera~ 
tion of immigration questions in general." This would 
entail mentioning "the degree of suffering which leads 
people to want to resettle in America. 0 Nash also wanted 
Truman to plug the displaced persons legislation before 
Congress at the time. The conclusion of the address, 
according to Nash, "would be an introduction to the succeed~ 
ing speeches on the Western trip. The President should 
1Memorandum from Nash to Clifford, found in the Nash 
Papers, Box 29, Chicago Speech File. 
speak as a Middle Westerner, stating for other Middle 
Westerners the American goal of freedom and opportunity, 
its fulfillment here in America, the nature of true 
Americanism, the West as. the cradle of latter-day 
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liberalism. 112 Nash's first draft, completed on May 21, 
mirrored these ideas. 3 The preliminary outline is indica-
tive of the early planning that went into the Chicago 
address. 
Though not an active participant in writing the 
speech, Clifford was a key figure in determining Truman's 
final speaking draft. This is evidenced by a memorandum 
from Clifford (dated in pencil by Elsey; 25 May, 48), 
which called for "the addition of an important timely 
issue that confronts this country today:" Communism in 
America. 4 Clifford called for the speech to come out 
strongly against communism; equally important was opposi-
tion to the Mundt-Nixon Bill, 5 legislation Clifford felt 
would have put a damper on citizens' civil liberties 
2Ibid. 
3First draft of the Speech, found in the Nash 
Papers, Box 29, Chicago Speech File. 
4This memorandum appears in the Elsey ·.·P~pers, 
Box 22, Swedish Centennial Speech File, and in the Clifford 
Papers, Box 32, Swedish Centennial Meeting File. 
5The Mundt-Nixon Bill proposed, among other things, 
that meetings of communist groups be prohibited, and that 
individuals suspected of "subversive" activity could be " 
arrested. 
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in order to attempt to ·combat .communism~. · Clifford :was .. yery 
much against the Mundt legislation, a position brought out 
in this memorandum: 
• this country should not ••• pass ••• laws 
to bar Communists or to eliminate the Conununist 
Party. That is an effort directed against sy.mptoms 
rather than cause ••• Communism cannot be stopped 
by the mere passing of laws or by the forcible 
effection of Communists •• The American people 
can eliminate the fear of Conununism, not by passing 
this kind of law or that kind of law but by devoting 
themselves to the basic concepts of liberty, 
justice, and equality among our people. 6
Clifford's May 25 memorandum had an inunediate impact on the 
drafting process. Nash and Elsey worked·together on the 
fourth draft, dated May 27, which mentioned the "legislation 
which is directed against communist activities" 7 pending in 
Co~gress at the time. While not specific, the Mundt-Nixon 
bill was sharply criticized in this draft: 
It seems time that the supporters of this legis-
lation are tilting at windmills. The spread of an 
idea cannot be controlled by the presence of laws, 
or by expelling people from the country. To attempt 
6The same memorandum noted above which appears in 
both the Elsey and Clifford Files. 
7The fourth draft, dated May 27, found in the Elsey 
Papers, Box 22, Swedish Centennial Speech File. 
to deal with communism in this way ls like seeking 
to improve the public health by making it illegal 
for germs to enter the human body. 8 
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The inclusion of communism as a key issue in this 
speech illuminates Clifford's power and importance in the 
actual drafting of the speeches. His opinion prevailed--
even though he did not actually draft the talk. This speech 
also shows how Clifford's speechwriters--in this case 
Phillie Nash and George Elsey--attempted to ·"Trumanize" 
Clifford's dry, mundane policy message. Clifford treats 
the Communism issue in a straightforward manner; Nash and 
Elsey took this idea and dramatized it with a lively meta-
phor--much more characteristic of the Presidential image 
they intended to project. 
Clifford's idea to bring up the fallacies of the bill 
in a discussion of Communism in America met with some opposi-
tion from the Attorney General's office. Assistant solicitor 
George Thomas Washington contacted the Truman damp on May 31 
to question the wisdom of making any comments on the Mundt 
Bill •. His reasoning was that such a discussion might spur 
Republicans to pass the bill, "potentially putti~g the 
9problem in Truman's lap." Clifford's original sentiments 
·81bi'd. 
9Memorandum, dated May 31, from George Thomas Washing-
ton to Clifford; this is in Elsey's handwriting, thus it is 
assumed that this came over the phone. Elsey Papers, Box 22, 
Swedish Centennial Speech File. 
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prevailed, however, and the speech did contain a very clear 
stand against both communism and the Mundt-Nixon legislation: 
recently we have been hearing some people 
say that the way to avoid the danger of communism in 
the United States is to p~ss a law--a law, for example, 
to check certain kinds of political activity. Some 
people think you can combat conununism by outlawing 
the Communist Party. 
It seems to be that such problems miss the point 
entirely. 
You cannot stop the spread of an idea by passing 
a law against it. 
You cannot stamp out communism by driving it 
~~~~rmd. 
You can prevent communism by more and better 
10 democracy. 
This excerpt further exemplifies the work done by speechwri-
ters Elsey and Nash to strengthen Clifford's policy mess~ge. 
Between the fourth and final drafts, their proposed colloquial 
analogy was replaced with this stro~ger anti-communist 
statement. The parallelism and repetition used here made 
Truman's position very clear. 
Truman himself made minor working changes in both the 
ninth and tenth drafts of the Chic~go address, apparently 
lOPublic Papers of the President, p. 289. 
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to improve his delivery, but no major ideas were either 
added or deleted by the President in these final two drafts. 
While Truman was undoubtedly an indirect influence in the 
speech's formation, he apparently had li~tle direct impact 
on the content of the Chicago address. Direct contribu-
tions were made by a number of individuals, most notably 
Clark Clifford. Truman's top political advisor exerted a 
significant amoun•t: of impact on this speech's content, as 
evidenced by the inclusion of Communism as the key issue, 
. 11
despite opposition from the State Department. 
Omaha: June 5 : 
Following the Chic~go address, Truman boarded the 
Presidential train for an all n~ght trip to Omaha. He 
spent much of the day paradi~g through downtown Omaha and 
meeting Omaha citizens that came out to meet the President; 
Truman was accepted enthusiastically by the crowd. Late 
that afternoon he ap_p_ea.r.ed in Boy's Town, Nebraska. This 
small village just outside of Omaha was the home of 
abandoned boys· from around the country; their "mayor" 
was a seventeen-year-old black youth named Eddie Dunn, 
of Miami, Florida. B.lack writers following the President's 
11see the ninth and tenth drafts of the speech along 
with ·the Pres·ident' s "Doodle sheet," in the Elsey Papers, 
Box 22, Swedish Centennial Speech File. 
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trip, Stanley Roberts and Mrs. Alice Dunnigan, gave Truman 
high marks for this publicity stopover. Roberts reported 
that Dunn gave Truman a religious painting in a ceremony, 
saying, "Mr. President, this is a token of our love and 
admiration for you. 1112 Truman's day of meeting · .. · ·. people 
in Omaha and Boy's Town was quite a success. 
That evening, Truman headed to the outskirts of 
Omaha to speak to the reunion of the Thirty-Fifth Division, 
the fighting unit in which he served in World War I. The 
address, .... 1bro.adcasted nationally on the radio, 
focused on the imprOving agricultural conditions and how the 
Truman Administration was on the side of the farmer. 
Unfortunately, most people incorrectly believed that Truman 
intendea to address-only the 35th Division; thus, only about 
one-fifth of the Coliseum was filled. The sparse crowd led 
to considerable adverse publicity: the media reported that 
the arena was empty, and virtually ignored the content of 
the address. 13 · Ti•m:e·' s cover~ge was typical: 
Altho~gh his trip had been well advertised, 
and admission was free, he had drawn an audience 
of only 2000. He made a f~ghti~g challenge to 
12Pi ttsbur·gh Courier, June 12, 19 4 8, p. 1. 
13Transcripts of Oral History interviews with Charles 
Murphy, June 3, 1963, p. 20. 
G.O.P. candidates to get Congress bust on a 
farm program, but one of his aides reported: 
"We had to chop a hole in the ice to get him 
t .. 14 OU. 
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In his memoirs, the President remembered that the Omaha 
speech was a disaster. "The Omaha fiasco was just bad 
man~gement. If we had had the meeting down town, we would 
15 have turned them away. " 
Truman's speech was found to be effective by his 
staff, however, despite his unfavorable press. A memor-
andum concerning the address.from Bill Batt to Clifford 
indicated that the overall reactions to the nationwide 
radio broadcast were excellent, especially when the Presi-
dent talked about continuing the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments. Batt advised usi~g a different kind of paper that 
would not make as much noise on the radio (to which Elsey 
wrote "nonsense") and making sure that no major points 
were missed because they were placed at the bottom of a 
page. Batt's most important suggestion, tho~gh, was that 
several of the sentences were too lo~g and involved; there 
were too many dependent clauses. In response to Batt's 
14Time, Volume 31, June 14, 1948, p. 16. 
15President's Personal Files: Memoirs, Box 5, file 
entitled "Politics - non-political trip-June, 1948." 
recommendations to cut sentence length, Elsey penciled 
in "He can't talk kindergarten all the time. 1116 
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This suggestion highlighted a significant conflict 
found between the White House staff and Batt's organiza-
tion. Batt appeared to be more interested in developing 
the plain speaking, man-around-the-corner image of the 
President. Elsey and other staff members are also con-
cerned about this, though I believe Elsey tried to develop 
this imag.e in the whistlestop talks more than in the major 
addresses. Despite this minor disagreement over the com-
plexity of Truman's Omaha address, it does remain certain 
that the creation of the Presidential "portrait" was impor-
tant to those in the Truman camp. 
Available evidence seems to show that the Omaha 
speech received less staff attention than did the Chic~go 
and California addresses. Still, contributions from top-
level bureaucrats are evident. For example, Acting Secre-
tary of Labor John W. Gibson sent a memorandum to Clifford 
on June 3rd, listing a set of short impromptu statements 
on topics such as labor-man~gement relations, housi~g, and 
1 . 17 rea wage earnings. Due to the fact that Truman's topic 
was ~griculture,· though, this material was not included in 
the Omaha address. 
16Memorandum from Batt to Clifford, found in the Elsey 
Papers, Box 23, "President's non-political trip--Press 
Reaction" Fi le. 
17Memorandum to Clifford from John w. Gibson, found 
in the Clifford Papers, Box 32, .West Coast Trip File. 
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Information contributed by Secretary of Agriculture 
Charles Brannan, though, was used in the Omaha speech. 
Brannan, who was, incidentally a member of the Ewing group, 
passed along to Elsey a list of farm income statistics 
germane to the topic of the address. 18 Truman utilized some 
of these figures to explain to the audience how well-off 
farmers were: 
Now, most of the Nation's farmers are enjoying 
the best financial position they have ever known. 
Cash farm income last year reached a record high 
level of more than $30 billion. In 1932 it was 
$4,700 million. Farm mortgage debt has dropped 
25 percent since 1941. Bank deposits and savings 
of farmers are $22 billion, the highest in our 
history. In 1932 you were afraid to_ go into a 
bank if you had any deposits to make, because you 
were afraid it would blow up in your face. In the 
last three years we haven't had a single bank 
failure in the United States. 19 
Input from key personnel in the Truman Administration is 
evident in the Omaha address. 
Upon his departure from Omaha, Truman toured the 
Pacific Northwest, speaking in many cities in Montana, 
18Memorart:dum to Clifford from Elsey dated June 5, 
found in the Elsey Papers, Box 23, "President's 'non-
political trip'--Press Reaction" File. 
19·pub'li•c· P'apers· ;of ·the President, p. 294. 
Idaho, Oregon, and Washington--including a major address 
in Seattle. 
Seattle: June 10: 
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In his speech before the Washington State Press 
Club, the President dealt with the region's all-important 
water issue. Here, Truman spoke of the disastrous flood 
which he often discussed in his whistlestops. His concern 
surfaced in his opening remarks: 
When I saw Grand Coulee Dam yesterday, it was 
l' pounded by the waters of the worst flood that had 
visited the Columbia River in 54 years. Mr. Banks, 
who is in charge out there, told me that a million 
acre-feet of water per 24 hours are going over the 
dam. That is almost incomprehensible. This flood 
has taken precious human lives. It has done tre-
mendous damage to towns and farms. I cannot express 
, too strongly the concern that this disaster has 
brought to me. But it is an experience from which 
we can learn a lesson that many of us learned a long 
. 20 time ago. 
Truman expressed sympathy for area residents and called 
for legislation designed to keep disaster from occurring in 
the future. Here, he supported development of water 
201bid., p. 319. 
projects in the region, citing the "millions of dollars--
and probably many human lives as well ••• saved because 
21 the floods have been stopped" by the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. Truman posited that the flooding could be 
controlled in the Columbia River basin as we11. 22 
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The Seattle address was a success because Truman· 
concentrated on the key issue of the region. The topic of 
water development was easy to focus on due to the flooding 
which occurred days earlier. Unfortunately, it is impossible 
to determine who put this speech t~gether--very few prelim-
inary drafts and no evidence of communication about the 
speech could be located at the Truman Library. 
Berkeley: June 12: 
The two California speeches--the address in Berkeley 
at the University of California and that to the Los Angeles 
Press Club--received by far the most attention from the 
White House staff. The Berkeley address, was, of course, 
the excuse Truman used to make this trip in the first 
place; perhaps for this reason a considerable amount of 
effort was put into the formulabi:on of the address. 
Preparation for the speech began as early as May 20, 
some twenty-three days before the actual speaki~g date. 
21rbid., p. 320. 
22rbid., pp. 320-321. 
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It is interesting to note that the staff began work on the 
Chicago address on the 18th; thus they were working on more 
than one speech at a time. On May 20th, Elsey came up with 
a list of the goals of the Berkeley speech. Foreign policy 
was the topic decided upon: according to Elsey, the Presi-
dent should focus on the United Nations, including the lon,9-
range role of the United States and the Soviet Union in this 
organization. 23 The Elsey memorandum signifies the early 
planning of the speech; this effort is the first evidence 
backing the position that extensive planning was involved 
here. 
An early but elaborate outlining stage is evident 
of the Berkeley address that does not appear in. 1.any of the 
other speeches on this trip. Four preliminary outlines--
from Clifford, Elsey, David Bell and Charles Murphy, and 
Secretary of State Advisor George Kennan--were drawn up 
between the 26th and 28th of May. From these, a "final 
outline" was prepared on May 29th, a creation very similar 
to the one prepared by Clifford on May 26. Though some of 
the points of the outline came from the efforts produced 
by Elsey, Kennan, and Bell and Murphy, the "final 
outline" was ·based on Clifford's earlier effort. Thus, 
while inputs of several individuals were taken into 
23outline found in the Elsey Papers, Box 23, 
Berkeley Speech File. 
54 
consideration, Clark Clifford was obviously at the helm 
. th 1 1 · . 24 in e ear y out ining process. 
A briefing session of May 29 for speechwriter Chariles 
Bohlen is evidenced by sketchy handwritten notes by George 
Elsey. 25 This meeting drew Bohlen together with Clifford, 
Elsey, and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett. 
Bohlen, an advisor to the u. s. delegation of the United 
Natchons' General Assembly, was chosen to write the early 
_drafts, undoubtedly because of his expertise in foreign 
policy. 
Bohlen came up with the first draft on J~ne first. 
His second draft was sent to Clifford on the following 
day. The drafting process was set aside for a few days, 
as draft number three was not completed until the 
seventh. Additional notes indicate that Elsey was 
heavily involved in editing Bohlen's first three drafts. 
Elsey's notes show that he was intent on shortening the 
third draft and rewording it to fit Truman's speaking 
style. In addition, he wrote of his intentions to include 
State Department foreign policy information from Sidney 
Soeurs and.George Kennan as well as a proposed draft 
24outlines found ·in·the ·Berkely Speech Files of 
both the Clifford Papers, Box 33, and the Elsey Papers, 
Box 22. 
25Handwritten notes found in the Elsey Papers, 
Box 22, Berkeley Speech File. 
26 of the address submitted by a lawyer from ~ew York. 
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Sometime early in June, Louis Nizer, of Phillips, 
Nizer, Benjamin, and Krim, sent to Clifford a complete 
proposal of the Berkeley speech, a proposition dealing 
with foreign policy. 27 It is difficult to determine 
whether or not this effort was ppenly solicited by the 
White House staff, though Nizer addressed Clifford as if 
they knew each other quite well. Both Clifford and Elsey 
took this draft quite seriously: Elsey noted to himself 
that portions of the Nizer script should be included if 
at all possible; 28 Clifford examined the copy from dover 
to cover, marking passages that could be used in the 
speech. However, very little of the Nizer draft appeared 
in the final speaking copy. Only the closing paragraph 
read by Truman in Berkeley resembled the script provided 
29 by the lawyer from New Y~rk. Though Nizer's effort was 
not extensively used in the actual address, the serious 
consideration_ given to this document is indicative of the 
widespread input considered by Clifford. 
26 More notes from. the Elsey Papers, Box 22, Berkeley 
Speech File. 
27oraft for the June 12th Address from Louis Nizer, 
found in the Clifford Papers, Box 33, Berkeley Speech File; 
also Public• ·papets· of the· p·reside·nt, p. 340. 
28Handwritten notes found in the Elsey Papers, Box 
22, Berkeley Speech File. 
29 f . . 1 · Draft rom Louis Nizer, C ifford Papers. 
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Between the third and fourth drafts a memorandum 
indicates a disagreement over the wording of the proposed 
anti-Soviet stateme~ts. Bohlen, as a speechwriter and 
advisor to the u. s. Delegation to the United Nations, was 
"doubtful as to the advisability of again making the record 
against the Soviet Union. 1130 In his June 7th memorandum to 
Elsey and Clifford: 
As I told you, I think that record has been 
spread pretty widely before the country by the 
secretary and in other speeches. From the point 
of view of policy, our feeling is that it is 
not the moment to agitate too much the Russian 
question. I, therefore, in this (third) draft 
eliminated some of the references to Soviet 
obstruction. 31 
The preferences of the Bohlen, and perhaps the State Depart-
ment as well, were short-lived. With help from Clifford and 
speechwriter David Bell, Elsey constructed the fourth draft, 
complete with a direct treatment of the strained relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union: 
30Memorandum from Bohlen to Elsey, dated June 7, 
attached to his copy of the third rough draft. Clifford 
Papers, Box 33, Berkeley Speech File·. 
31Ibid. 
The division has not been the United States 
against the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union 
against the free nations of the world, repre-
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senting the majority of mankind. All that is required 
to_'.,.•··- .. restore a sense of security to the world 
is for the Soviet Union to stop obstructing the 
efforts of the vast majority of mankind to 
h . 1 f'd d t ·1·t 32 ac 1eve mutua con 1 ence an ranqu1 1 y. 
In Berkeley, Truman's personal comments about the Soviet 
Union mirror the fourth draft. Truman indicted the Soviets 
for boycotti~g the "Little Assembly" and other United 
Nations commissions. He also cha~ged that the Soviet Union 
was guilty of "indirect asgression against others in the 
Middle East" and that she 11 used the veto excessively and un-
reasonably in the Security Council o.:fi the United Nations. 1133 
From the actual speech, it appears that Truman's immediate 
staff--Clifford and Elsey--took other's efforts into con-
sideration, but still were the final decision-makers in 
the speechwriting process. 
Much happened in the final 48 hours precedi~g the 
actual address. Draft five, completed the morni~g of 
32 Fourth draft, found in the Elsey Papers, Box 22, 
Berkeley Speech File. 
33Public Paper·s· o·f· the ·Preside·nt, p. 338. 
58 
Thursday, June 10, was created by David Bell and George 
Elsey. That afternoon, Elsey talked with several people 
and took notes on these conversations. He first spoke 
with Bohlen about the situation in Austria. Later, Elsey 
conversed with Clifford about buildi~g up the conclusion, 
and with Robert Lovett on atomic energy, the situation in 
G d th t . 1 t d t f . 1· 34 A · reece, an o er opics re a e o oreign po icy. gain, 
this points out the extensive interaction between Elsey, 
Clifford, and top-level bureaucrats regarding the speech. 
Draft number six, completed on Friday, June 11, was 
co-authored by David Bell, Philleo Nash, and George Elsey. 
Clifford and Charles Murphy edited this final draft, addi-
tional copies went to Sidney Souers and Charles Bohlen for 
their comments as well. 35 Additional handwritten notes 
located in the Elsey Papers indicate that a discussion took 
place on Friday afternoon on which draft--the fifth or 
sixth--was to be given to the President. 36 As it turned 
out, Truman's final remarks came from a combination of these 
two drafts, both of which were_ geared toward fore~gn policy. 
34Elsey's handwritten notes, found in the Elsey 
Papers, Box 22, Berkeley Speech File. 
35Assorted copies of the sixth draft, found in the 
Elsey Papers, Box 22, Berkeley Speech File. 
36see the Elsey Papers, Box 22, Berkeley Speech File. 
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In the address, Truman repeatedly chastised the 
Soviet Union, not only for her disregard for the "principles 
on international conduct" in the United Nations, but for 
the Soviet position in the "disturbing" Korean situation as 
well. .. 
There (Korea) the Soviet Government has defied 
the clearly expressed will of an overwhelming major-
ity of the United Nations, by boycotting the United 
Nations Temporary Commission on Korea •••• The 
Soviet boycott has prevented the residents of the 
northern zone of Korea from electing representatives 
to establish~-a-: un±f±ed:-:natiiona.1-: gove~runent·• for · ,: 
Korea. 37 
The President closed the address with a strong, broad foreign 
policy statement: 
I stated our American policy for peace at the 
end of the war. It has been restated many times, 
but I shall repeat the essential elements of our 
policy again so that there can be no mis.under-
standing anywhere by anyone. 
"We seek no territorial expansion or selfish 
advantage. 
"We have no plans for ~ggression against any 
other state, large or small. 
37Pub'lic Papers of the P-resident, p. 339. 
"We have no objective which need clash with 
the peaceful aims of any other nation. 
The United States has been conscientious and 
. t t. ·t d t· t th · · 1 38 consis en in is evo ion o ose princip es. 
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The firm stance taken against the Soviets was a success, 
considering the favorable press received by the President. 
Editorials in the New York Times, Washington Star, and 
Washington Daily News lauded the word of Truman, crediting 
his "open door" policy·>wi th regard to the Soviet Union. 39 
Time reported that Truman's address was "one of the best of 
his career. 1140 The Washington Post used the word "admirable" 
to describe the speech, adding that, if anything was problem-
atic, it was that the address should have been made much 
1 . 41 ear ier. 
The success of the Berkeley address was most likely 
due to lengthy preparations conducted by the Truman staff. 
The outlining process began more than three weeks prior to 
the President's speak date; large amounts of interaction 
amo~g at least a dozen individuals 42 evidences considerable 
38rbid., pp. 339--;-340. 
39Edi~9rials),:~rom the New York Times, Washington 
Dai•ly News, and wa·shington S'tar, all dated June 14, 1948. 
40Time, Volume si, June 21, 1948, p. 24. 
41washington Post, June 15, 1948, p. 1. 
42George Elsey, Clark Clifford, Charles Murphy, 
David Bell, Philleo Nash, Charles Bohlen, Sidney Souers, 
George Kennan, Louis Nizer, Robert Lovett, David Niles, and 
undoubtedly others. 
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input into the speechwriting process between May 20 and 
June 12. Contributions came not only from the White House 
staff and the speechwriters, but from key cabinet members, 
Truman Administration officials, and local political leaders 
as well. Due to the foreign policy nature of the address, 
a significant amount of input is evident from the State 
Department. Still, Clark Clifford determined the content 
of the Berkeley address after carefully weighing the opinions 
of his fellow contributors. 
The Berkeley address was the fourth in a series of 
strong, issue-oriented speeches, all of which were well 
accepted by the media. Each speech was carefully thought 
out and written in an attempt to present Truman as a re-
sponsible individual. He was seen taki~g definitive stances 
against the Soviets and the Mundt-Nixon Bill; and in favor 
of displaced persons legislation and the development of 
water projects in the West. Thus, the audience is pre~ 
sented with the serious side of the President: these four 
policy addresses depicted Truman as an intelligent, articu-
late person, firmly stati~g his position on::several key 
issues. 
Los Angeles : . :t Junie 14 : 
Each of Truman's first four major speeches, labeled 
"non"":'political," could actually pass as such: in each case, 
the President addressed a particular audience about a 
particular subject, be it fore~gn policy, ~griculture, or as 
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in Seattle, the local flood conditions. The final address, 
though, was openly political. Here, speaking to the Greater 
Los Angeles Press Club, Truman strongly attacked the "do-
nothing" Congress, stressing Congressional inactivity. He 
demonstrated his toughness in his strong statements, 
indicating a willingness to fight Congress for legislation 
he deemed necessary. Eight key concerns were aggressively 
discussed--high prices, housing shortages, the labor 
situation, social security, health programs, education, 
agriculture, and water--with the blame for the problems 
related to these issues placed on the 80th Congress. 
As with the other speeches, the drafting of the Los 
Angeles address began early. A letter to Charles Murphy 
from Leon Keyserling, a member of the "Ewing Group," 
indicated that Bill Batt and his organization constructed 
a preliminary draft, sometime in the last week in May. 
Another early draft dated May 29 was created by Keyserling 
in response to what he thought was an inferior draft by 
Batt. The attempts by Batt and Keyserling were way off 
base regarding· the Clifford objective of leveling pressure 
on the 80th Congress. The Keyserling draft was especially 
inappropriate: his Goldwateresque writing style contained 
only the gloomy, depressing facts about the current situa-
tion, void of solutions for the stated problems. The 
fifth draft developed by Batt was notably different from 
his earlier attempts, yet it still lacked the direction 
sought by Clifford. 43 
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Significant stylistic differences between the fifth 
and sixth drafts indicates a change of speechwriters. The 
anonymous sixth draft is much different from the statistical, 
almost clinical approach taken by Bill Batt in the previous 
draft. 44 
An undated outline appears in the Clifford Papers, 
closely resembling the outline Truman actually spoke from 
45 in Los Angeles. This outline was totally unrelated to 
the previous proposals. Because Truman's actual address 
folwowed the guidelines of the Clifford outline, and not 
the earlier drafts, it is ~pparent that the outline was 
completed after the rough drafts, perhaps due to Clifford's 
dissatisfaction with efforts of the speechwriters. One 
could conjecture that Clifford produced this effort at 
the last minute to salv~ge the speech·after seeing the 
. . k b h ·t 46 direction ta en y t e wri ers. 
43All of these drafts, letters, found in the Clifford 
Papers, Box 33, Los Angeles Press Club File. 
44Assorted drafts in the Los Angeles Press Club 
Files of both the Clifford Papers, Box· 33, and the Elsey 
Papers, Box 22. 
45outline found in the Clifford Papers, Box 33, Los 
Angeles Press Club File. 
46 rbid. 
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Clifford suggested that:t.he eight major issues be 
discussed by Truman at length. Important here was that the 
President should stress the inactivity of the 80th Congress: 
Truman's speaking outline included at least one phrase or 
sentence on each issue area that would lead him to criticize 
the Legislature. Excerpts from this outline indicate this 
fact: 
(1) High Prices* 
b. Congress failure to act. 
(2) Housing 
b. History of l~gislation. 
c. Recently reported by House Committee on 
Banking and Currency by vote of fourteen 
to thirteen. Eleven of the fourteen 
were Democrats. 
(3)· Labor 
a. Party now in control of Co~gress promised 
to build up Labor Department, but 
has wrecked it. 
b. Specifically -
·l. Removed Mediation Service 
11. Tryi~g to take out The Employment Service 
111. Cut appropriations for Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
*These are not misnumbered; I have only chosen rele-
vant points dealing with Congress for this section. 
c. Record on Minimum Wage legislation. 
(4) Social Security 
a. Recommendations made over and over again. 
b. Congress has studied for over two years. 
c. Now it has passed a bill so had I had 
to veto it - just th~s morning - because 
it would have taken social security benefits 
away from over half a million people. 
(5) Health 
c. I have repeatedly recommended that the 
\ 
CC.ngress pass a healt:t1 insurance law, 
..
but it has not acted. 
(6} Education 
b. I have recommended Federal aid. 
c. Bill has passed the Senate and could easily 
and quickly be passed by House of 
Representatives. 
( 7) · Agri•c·ulture 
c. Co~gress has been consideri~g this since 
the first of last year. 
d. Now it is time to act. 
(8)· Wate·r· Re·s·ources 
b. Congress has cut Budget f~gures. 47 
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47speaki~g outline for the Los Angeles Speech, found 
in the President's Secretary's Files, Box 27, "Or~ginals," 
(readi~g copies), April-June, 1948. 
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Giving the address, the President chided Congress for 
not passing needed legislation in each of the eight areas. 
His remarks on the nation's educational situation were per-
haps the most critical: 
I made a recommendation to the Congress that 
the Federal Government make a contribution to 
the support of the schools of the Nation. 
No action. No action. It's the most dis-
graceful thing in this country. The bill 
has passed the Senate. It wouldn't take 10 
minutes for it to pass the House, if they weren't 
t i It th 48 roos ing on i over ere. 
Truman followed his criticisms of Congress by cleverly easing 
his harsh statements in his closi~g remarks: 
And I do this {criticize Congress) in a most 
kindly frame of mind. I know the majority of the 
Co~gressmen. As individuals they are fine people. 
I have some of the best friends in the world in the 
Co~gress, but when I speak of the 80th Congress and 
its accomplishments in the last year and a half, I 
say that that Congress has not done much for the 
beriefi t of the people. 49 
48Public Papers of the President, p. 352. 
4·9·Ibi'd., p. 353_. 
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It is especially interesting to note that Truman's 
speaking outline specifically included a section pertaining 
to the idea that Congress "owes it to the people to stay 
in session to get the job done. 1150 According to the 
outline, the President was to "call on Congress to stay in 
Washington until they have acted on needed legislation." 51 
Sometime during the speech, though, Truman decided not to 
call Congress back for a special session; he saved this 
proclamation for his acceptance speech of the Democratic 
Presidential nomination on July ls. 52 The deletion of this 
section is exemplary of the only recorded impact Truman had 
on any one of his key speeches and was made possible by 
the freedom allowed the President by the outline he spoke 
from, freedom he did n0.t have when reading from prepared 
scripts in the other four major speeches. However, Truman 
still did not appear to have any influence in the planning 
stages of the address, which was still the result of much 
work from Clifford and his associates. In fact, the 
drafti~g process.;.is additional evidence of the power held 
by Clark Clifford. He totally ~gnored staff efforts and 
created the President's speaki~g outline himself. Truman 
had impact thro~gh deletion, not planni~g. 
50speaking outline of the Los Angeles Address, 
President's Secretary's Files. 
·' . ',.,,·,s2··: ·~:c,.'.., .......... . 
Public Papers of the President, p. 409-410. 
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While Clifford rejected the drafts of the Los 
Angeles address, much effort was made to keep the speech 
both up-to-date and sensitive to the interests of the 
people of California. This is evidenced by several factors. 
First, the most current statistical information, such as 
price indexes and housing costs, was sought. In fact, 
one copy of the eighth draft indicated the confirmation 
by economic advisor Keyserling of the legitimacy of a 
claim made that, in April, 1948, record highs were reached 
by both wholesale and retail prices, and that these prices 
were still rising. 53 Truman did use this data in his 
discussion of price index increases: 
at the time that those price controls 
were released, it was in the neighborhood of 130 
or 133. Immediately after those price controls 
were released, that price index went up 20 points, 
and it has been steadily climbing ever since. 
It now stands in the neighborhood of 172 and 
a fraction. That means that costs of everything 
that you can buy--food, clothing--everything 
that you have to buy, has_ gone up 50 percent. 
53Marginal comments on a copy of the eighth draft 
of the Los Angeles address. Elsey Papers, Box· 22, Los 
Angeles Press Club File,, 
That means that the dollar that was worth a dollar 
at 133 is worth about 66 2/3 cents at the present 
t . 54ime. 
Truman effectively blamed Congress for this unfortunate 
situation: 
This 80th Congress has said that prices would 
adjust themselves. They have almost gone off the 
graph adjusting themselves in favor of the man who 
controls the goods, and the consumer pays through 
55the nose. 
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Second, we have several men--Bill Batt, David Bell, 
and George Elsey--who suggested changes in the address, 
taking into consideration the activities of Congress. One 
such statement came from Batt, dated June 12. Batt was 
concerned with Senator Taft's attacks on the President. 
Taft had recently stated that President Truman would veto 
anythi:11g and everything that Congress accomplished. In 
response to this claim, Batt proposed a par~graph Truman 
should use to combat this claim: 
The Co~gress can rest assured that I will not 
veto any proposal aimed at·advanci~g the welfare 
of· ·a·11 the people of the United States. I will 
veto special interests legislation aimed at 
profiting the few at the expense of the many. 
5·4Publ'ic Papers of' the President, p •. 349,.· 
5·5·Ibid., p. 349. 
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I will veto any further attempts to repeal 
the great social and economic gains of the past 
. t 56 six een years. 
This is evidence of an attempt to keep the speech as current 
as possible, even though Batt's particular suggestions were 
not included in Truman's outline. Clifford had Truman deal 
with this issue indirectly by delving into the failures of 
Congress. Here, Truman stated that vetoes were of legisla-
tion favoring special interest; it was implied that the 
President would not veto legislation created to solve 
current problems. 
Third, a letter to Senator McGrath from his brother 
Harold, of the California State Democratic Committee, in-
dicates communication between the national and local 
Democratic National Committees. According to Harold 
McGrath, two men, Democratic State Vice-Chairman John 
McEnery and Jackson Day Treasurer Herbert Erskine, should 
be invited to meet the Presidential train in Portland. 
This was s~9gested presumably to provide the Presidential 
party with last minute briefings on the affairs of the 
state, thus prepari~g Truman for the important Los A~geles 
speech ·as well as his whistlestop talks across the state. 57 
56carbon copy of s~ggested change in the speech, found 
in the Clifford Papers, Box 33, Los Angeles Press Club File. 
57Letter from Harold McGrath to Senator Howard 
McGrath, found in the Chapman Papers, Box 84, California 
Presidential Trip File. 
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Fourth, of the Truman staff's activities to remain sensitive 
to public opinion would be Oscar Chapman's attempts to delve 
into opinion concerning the water issue. In response to his 
~~ques~ .to .. the Colorado River Association, a memorandum 
returned presenting their proposal for an inclusion to 
the address of a section supporting future water projects 
on both the OWens and Colorado Rivers. Their public 
relations director, Robert Lee, stressed that this proposal 
had the support of the entire Southern California Congressional 
delegation, as well as many other key organizations in the 
southern part of the state. Lee concluded that "Water is 
one subject of basic importance on which there is no 
d . ff f . . . th. t t 1158 i erence o opinion in is s a e. Truman did include 
the water issue in his eight points before the Los Angeles 
Press Club, perhaps due to the suggestion of the Colorado 
River Association and said he supported these projects: 
I want to see the water resources of these 
rivers properly used. I want to see the proper 
development of the Columbia River Basin, the 
Central Valley of California, and the Colorado 
River. I want to see them integrated on a 
58Memorandum dated June 7, 1948, from the Colorado 
River Association to Thomas P. Scully, found in the Chapman 
Papers, Box 84, California Presidential Trip File. 
power basis, so that they won't have to have a 
"brown-out"· in California in the summer time. 59 
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It is quite obvious that both the Los Angeles and 
Berkeley addresses contained a considerable amount of input 
from a considerable amount of individuals. George Elsey 
had a good deal of influence in the Berkeley speech; his 
seemingly total involvement in that effort could have kept 
him from working extensively on the Los Angeles speech. 
Again, Clifford played the key role in the organization and 
development of the speech. He had the idea to have Truman 
call Congress back for an extra session; the question of why 
Truman would skip this section is an interesting one. Such 
a deletion of this key point is the only apparent instance 
of Truman making major changes in the content of the main 
speeches. 
The firm stand taken by Truman ~gainst Congress 
constitutes what I see as the third element of the Presi~ 
dential image. Already, we have seen how Truman was por-
trayed informally to bri~g out his homespun characteristic; 
the issue orientation of the first four·key speeches allowed 
the serious, intelligent side of Truman to sur:fiace. Added 
to this, now, was the Los A~geles speech. Here, Truman is 
depicted as fighting for much needed l~gislation--the 
audience can thus conclude that Truman was\ ,also a tough 
President, working hard for the passage of needed 
leg is la tion. 
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This section dealing with Truman's major addresses 
should be entitled "All the President's Men." Individuals 
from a variety of backgrounds and interests were included 
in the drafting process of Truman's key speeches. The 
only important figure that does not fit into the speech-
writing process, though, is the President himself. He 
placed the responsibility for this procedure in the hands 
of Clark Clifford, perhaps due to the vast amount of time 
he allocated to meeting local dignitaries and in 
maintaining his duties as Head of State. 
Clifford seemed to have more influence than anyone 
else; although he did not play an important role in the 
actual writing of the ppeeches, he had control over the 
final versions through his outlini~g and editi~g activities. 
And, while his word prevailed over the drafti~g process it 
is evident that he seriously considered s~ggestions from 
top-level bureaucrats, political advisors, speechwriters, 
and White House staff personnel. 
Altho~gh the Democratic National Committee was 
heavily involved in the planni~g of the tour, the organi-
zation had little impact on the content of the Truman speeches. 
Accordi~g to speechwriter John Franklin Carter, "The 
campa~gn was really run by • • • a small group from the 
74 
White House. The Democratic National Committee contributed 
virtually nothing to his (Truman's) campaign. It (D.N.C.) 
did, of course, work--worked quite efficiently--but the 
real work was done by a comparably small group on the White 
House payroll. 1160 This s~ggests that the Democratic 
National Committee was more concerned with regaini~g a 
Congressional majority and concentrated their efforts in 
this direction--leaving Truman's re-election to Clifford 
and the White House staff. 
While it played a significant role in the preparation 
of the whistlestop talks, the Research Division of the 
Democratic National Committee had little impact on the 
formulation of the major addresses. Bat~s attempts at 
drafti~g the Los Angeles speech were unsuccessful. The 
Division's main contribution was to provide background 
information and pertinent statistics for the whistlestop 
and main addresses. 
Overall, the main addresses of the June tour comple-
mented Truman's.whistlestop talks quite effectively. People 
liked this nice man speaking before them, due to Truman's 
folksy, down-to-earth manner projected from the back plat-
form. And, while people liked Truman as an individual 
from these appearances, they also developed a respect for 
60Transcripts of Oral History Interviews with John 
Franklin Carter, October 7, 1948, p. 5. 
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their President when they heard or read about his well-
written, issue-oriented policy addresses in Chicago, Omaha, 
Seattle, and Berkeley. From these, voters were able to see 
that Truman was intelligent and responsible enough to hold 
this high office. In addition, the final main address in 
Los Angeles presented to the Nation yet another side of 
the President: he was t.o.µgh. _Battling :: tirelessly, with 
Congress as the enemy, Truman was depicted as working to 
pass needed legislation for the benefit of all. Thus, 
Truman's major speeches highlighted other elements of the 
President's personality, that, when combined with the 
homespun image brought out in the informal talks, por-
trayed the candidate from Missouri as a likeable man, 
able to handle the difficult and demanding office of President 
of the United States. 
CHAPTER V 
EFFECTS OF THE TRIP ON THE FALL CAMPAIGN 
As an unexpected bonus, the June Western trip proved 
to be vital in helping the Truman staff prepare for the fall 
campaign. Indeed, Charles Murphy indicated in his oral 
history interview that the trip was successfubhad Truman 
not had the opportunity to learn his lessons from this tour, 
Murphy said that subsequent campaign trips would have gone 
1 much less smoothly. In a speech at Princeton University 
following the election, George Elsey pointed out that the 
June trip epitomized the tactics the White House would 
implement on train trips from Labor Day through the election: 
My point about the June trip is this: it laid 
the pattern that the President was to follow in 
the coming campaign. It greatly increased his 
popularity, assuring his nomination at Philadelphia. 
Before his western tour nobody would have given 
a pl~gged nickel for his chances of being nominated, 
but after the trip·he had little trouble. 2 
1Transcripts of Oral History Interviews with Charles 
Murphy, May 2, 1963, pp. 4-5. 
2 1 h ' . A Geo~ge E sey speec _ given at Princeton, January, 
19 49. Copy of his remarks found in the),:Elsey Papers, Box 
32, Folder entitled 11 1948 Campaign-reference material 
remarks by G.M.E. at Princeton re 1948 election." 
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Basically, the tour seemed to aid Truman and his 
staff in three ways. First, and most obvious, is that 
Truman's popularity increased during the trip. For the 
first time, people saw Harry Truman as a human being, not 
merely as some person who sat in the White House and ran 
the country. Murphy discussed this idea in an oral history 
interview. During many of the stops along the way, he and 
Clifford would "go out and mingle with the crowd and see 
what the reaction was" 3 to Truman's speeches. The responses 
received by Murphy were, on the whole, quite encouraging: 
• a very typical reaction that you would 
hear from people :in the crowd was, "why he's a nice 
man, I like him. He's not at all like what they 
say about him in the papers." And this you would 
hear time after time. 4 
Additional evidence indicative of Truman's gains 
in popularity from the June tour stems from the fact that 
crowds became larger as the trip progressed. Both Time 
anc;k,Charles Murphy noted that the whistlestop speech in 
Butte, Montana, was the turni~g point of the trip. Time 
reported that, in Butte, ·the President "launched a passion-
ate and rashly phrased assault on the Republican Co~gress"--
this was received by enthusiastic crowds and "real applause." 5 
3Transcripts of Oral History Interviews with Charles 
Murphy, May 2, 1963, p. 26. 
Aib'i~i'., p. 26. 
-5Time, Volume. 51, June 21, 1948, p. 24. --.
Irwin Ross, in his book entitled The Lonel.ies.t CB¥tpaigIJ., 
concluded that 
• from Montana westward the crowds grew 
in size and enthusiasm. In Butte, 40,000 people 
crowded the downtown section_to give Truman a 
boisterous welcome; 10,000 filled an outdoor sta-
dium for his speech. In Seattle, the police 
estimated the street crowd at 100,000--the largest 
outpouring in thirty years, more than Roosevelt 
had drawn. At Berkeley some 55,000 were on hand 
in an outdoor arena for his commencement speech 
Two days later, in Los Angeles, the 
President received the most enthusiastic welcome 
of the trip. Between 750,000 and 1,000,000 
people lined the flag-draped route •••• Truman 
rode through the streets like a homecoming hero. 6 
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In addition, Elsey remembered that many correspondents were 
sent to join the train as the media saw that the event was 
important news. 7 
The second factor is related to the first: while 
the people who actually saw the President adjusted their 
opinions of him, Truman, in turn, became aware of how 
6Ross, op. cit., p. 88. 
7Elsey's Princeton Speech, Elsey Papers. 
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citizens viewed him. Truman found that.he was held respon-
sible for inaction on several main issues, a problem that, 
according to Elsey, he successfully found solutions for. 
At Princeton, Elsey discussed Truman's awareness of how 
citizens in the West saw the President and how he dealt 
with this on the June trip: 
••• in the West he was unpopular because he 
was ~eld responsible for the slash in funds for 
flood control and for rural electrification. 
When he realized that the sins of the 80th Congress 
were being blamed on him, he began a new kind of 
speech and he took a new approach. He began a 
series of open, blunt attacks on Congress, calling 
it the worst in American history. Item by item 
••• he reviewed the requests he had made of 
Congress and Congress's action on them. He 
dramatized the clash between the President and 
Congress and between the Democrats and Republicans. 8 
The trip enabled the White House staff to discover the 
n~gative presidential irn~gewhich resulted from the lack 
of needed legislation. This liability was turned into a 
stre~gth as Truman shifted the blame from his shoulders to 
Capitol Hill, thus counteracting his dilemma. 
·8·rbi'd. 
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Third, the actual practice of going through a busy, 
intense trip was good practice for the actual campaign. It 
takes time for any group of people to work together success-
fully; this trip provided an opportunity for Truman's cam-
paign staff to perfect the process of preparing both the 
platform and major speeches. 
Elsey said that his staff viewed the trip as pre-
. f th . . 9 paration or e upcoming campaign. The trip allowed the 
White House staff to refine the outlining process for the 
whistlestop speeches. A typical speech session on the 
train, remembers Murphy, would usually include Truman, 
Murphy himself, Clifford, Charles Ross, and others. This 
group went over each draft, revised them, and gave instruc-
tions for change. The speechwriting process ran very 
smooth·ly during the final stretch of the campaign, due 
to the considerable amount of practice provided by the 
. t 10 pre-campaign our. 
In addition, the trip also enabled the staff to 
determine what was successful on the whistlestop platform. 
Toward the end of the campaign, material deemed a success 
due to its positive response in earlier talks was recycled 
in whistlestops down the homestretch of the campaign. Murphy 
9Transcripts of Oral History interviews with George 
Elsey, July 12, 1969, pp. 195-198. 
lOTranscripts of Oral History Interviews with Charles 
Murphy, May 2, 1963, pp. 4-5. 
recalled that, as a proving ground for platform material, 
the June trip was very important to the Truman staff. 
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The refinement of the campaign process in June 
produced later train trips that captured the interest of the 
media which, in turn, drew interest from the public as well. 
Three scheduling lessons were learned. First, Clifford 
thought that Truman's success in Los Angeles was due to the 
President's early arrival in the city. By reaching the city 
the night before the main address, Truman was able to meet 
with many community leaders and be seen by large numbers of 
people. 11 Second, the key speech was found to climax the 
day of campaigning most effectively when it was aired in 
the evening. 12 And finally, the White House staff realized 
that it was very effective for the President to speak on a 
13 number of different issues in each day. 
Each of these scheduling ideas· ·was::_incm;porated·:_i.:r1to 
the fall campaign. Truman was scheduled in a large city all 
day, thus inevitably meeting with large nurnbers of people. 
In addition, the newspeople were intrigued by the President's 
ability to talk about several key issues throughout the day. 
11Publication entitled "Advice on the Western Trip, 11 
found in the Clifford Papaers, Box 20, folder entitled 
"Campaign Material, 1948-." 
12Transcripts of Oral History Interviews with Geo~ge 
Elsey, July 12, 1969, p. 198. 
131bid., pp. 19S-i9a. 
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This led reporters to pay more attention to Truman's state-
ments, and the newspapers buzzed with stories about the 
number of topics that were being addressed daily. 14 
While the trip apparently led to increases in the 
President's popularity, I believe that the most significant 
impact was the ef feet it had on the remainder. of the cam-
paign. The June trip was a testing ground for new informa-
tion and a new format, the successful of which was kept for 
the later talks. The White House staff, thro~gh their 
observations on what occurred in June, scheduled the Presi-
dent in a way that gathered the attention of the news media 
which subsequently led to increasing publicity for President 
Truman. And finally, when Truman learned from the June trip 
that he was held responsible for the inactivity of the 80th 
Congress, he dealt with this errant notion by blaming 
Congress for the lack of legislation in key issue areas--
thus came the stro~g attacks on the "do-nothing_~~ 80th 
Congress. 
14 ... 
Ibid., pp. 195-19.8. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The June tour was important to the re-election of 
H,arry Truman. When Clark Clifford originally thought of a 
pre-campaign trip in 1947, he stressed that the President 
would gain needed publicity without appearing to be 
politicking. Thus, Truman departed Washington on June third 
to undertake a fifteen day, 10,000 mile trip.that, under a 
"non-political" guise, was in fact carefully planned. The 
trip turned out to surpass the expectations of all involved; 
its success aided in the re-election of a President many 
experts thought to be unelectable. 
The behind-the-scenes activities were based on care-
fully made, well thought out plans formulated by a variety 
of individuals. Extensive preliminary work was undertaken· 
by J. Howard McGrath and the Democratic National Committee. 
This was followed up by the Research Division and George 
Elsey who combined efforts in order to develop speaking 
outlines for the whistlestop talks. Important, here, was 
the reconstruction of the Presidential image. The platform 
talks counteracted the image created by mass media: Truman 
was portrayed as a simple, plain-speaki~g person with a 
definite sense of humor, an image quite different from the 
one pe9ple had_ gathered from newspapers. In addition, 
Truman's informality from the back platform was a key element 
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in these talks. His frank, off-the-cuff, at times bold, 
statements made these events seem spontaneous, although many 
individuals carefully planned what Truman would discuss 
before each audience • 
. Even more work went into the formulation of Truman's 
five major addresses. A number of individuals--from key 
bureaucrats ~uch as Leon Keyserling and Charles Bohlen to 
local Democratic leaders like Harold McGrath; from speech-
writers Philleo Nash and David Bell to civic. groups such as 
the Colorado River Association--contributed a host of 
information to keep major speeches in line with current 
events and preferences of the local audience. In cha~ge of 
formulating the key speeches was Clark Clifford: he 
coordinated the inputs from a wide variety of individuals 
in creating a successful campaign tour. 
Another image of the President was developed in the 
President's five major addresses. In addition :to being 
depicted as informal and spontaneous. Truman came across as 
a stro~g, intelligent President, and,.in Los A~geles, 
stubborn eno~gh to combat Co~gress for desired l~gislation. 
Thus, the June trip provided the audience with· three images 
of President Truman--down-to-earth, intelligent, and tenacious 
--a combination which undoubtedly led to increasing respect 
for the President and renewed interest in his daily 
activities. 
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Of the key individuals involved in the tour, only 
Truman himself had little to do with the preparat.9ry activi-
ties. Although he probably talked with Clifford and the 
others about the trip,· -none of these conversations can· be 
documented, nor are they mentioned in papers at the Truman 
Library or in the numerous· Oral History Interviews I 
examined. Hi.s impact on· the final content of his talks 
occurred in his off-the-cuff remarks and spontaneous 
statements from the back platform and in Los Angeles. In 
his other four major addresses--Chicago, Omaha, Seattle, and 
Berkeley--the President's apparent input was limited to 
minor working changes found in the final drafts. Because 
Truman was kept very busy with other duties, he left the 
details of his June trip to be worked out by his staff and 
Clark Clifford. 
The June cross-country trip was important in main-
taini~g a Democrat in the White House, not only because of 
the publicity and favorable reactions which resulted direct-
ly from the tour, but due to the ins~ghts it produced on 
handli~g the campa;i.gn as well. This was a time for Truman's 
backers to work out the flaws in their campaign procedures. 
When it came time ·to campaign down the stretch, the Truman 
staff had an effective procedure down pat which was 
developed and perfected in June. 
The trip also enabled the President and his staff 
to see that Truman was being blamed by the citizenry for 
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(ack of activity in solving many domestic problems. With 
~s in mind, the June trip and the bulk of the act.ual cam-
tgn was prepared in a way that Truman could counteract 
1se beliefs, returning the charges of inactivity to the 
th Congress. The President criticized Congressional 
I
rion on several occasions beginning in Butte on June 8: 
If this Congress goes away without passing an 
agricultural bill, without passing a housing bill, 
without doing something about prices, this Congress 
has not done anything for the country. They should 
stay there until they_ get things done. 1 
man blamed the electorate for the bad record of Congress 
his remarks the following day in Spokane, Washington: 
I am trying to carry out that platform, but I 
am not getting very much help from this Co~gress. 
That is partly your fault! That is part;ty· · 
your fault. In the election of 1946 you believed 
all the lies that were published about your 
President. And two-thirds of you didn't even 
go out and vote. Look what the other third 
gave you! You deserved it. 2 
·1Ptili'l'ic• Pape·r-s· of the Preside·nt, p. 306. 
·2rbid., p. 309. 
Criticisms of Congress continued through the June 14 Los 
Angeles Address, the remainder of the June tour, and the 
subsequent campaign that fall. 
For the reasons stated above, I see this cross-
country trip as a key element leading to the re-election 
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of President Truman. The tour-enabled the President to 
appear to be a likeable person on the back platform. Over-
coming his speaking weaknesses with the use of outlines, 
the "real" Harry s. Truman came out: people could easily 
identify with a plainspoken President with a sense of 
humor. At the same time, the informal nature of the 
whistlestop speeches allowed Truman to lash out against the 
80th Congress, even though his intent was "non-political." 
Camouflaging his intent with his informality, Truman set 
out across the West and said some very significant things 
about Communism and the·Soviet Union, Congress and many 
domestic problems. This ~ggressive approach carried through 
the campa~gn that fall as well: throughout:·tlle f5\ll, T..t:uman 
spoke as often as possible, on a variety of issues, to a 
variety of audiences--but he kept with him the stro~g 
stand taken against the Co~gress, a stand which he first 
realized would be beneficial while campaigning unofficially 
out West in June. 
Truman surpassed the barriers constructed by his 
opponents and surprised G.O.P. nominee Thomas Dewey, who 
felt assured of victory. Dewey's demise was due in part 
to Clark Clifford's extensive planning, dating back to 
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194 7 with the "Clifford Memorandum." Clifford's fore-
sight many months before the election included the notion 
of a pre-campaign, non-political trip, an event which 
undoubtedly helped candidate Harry S. Truman remain in the 
White House for four more years. 
